Edoba B. Omorogie

Circumstantial evidence has been defined as a number of circumstances, which are accepted so as to make a complete unbroken chain of evidence1. It is also defined as the evidence of surrounding circumstances and facts from which an inference of the existence or otherwise of a fact in issue can be made2. It could also be construed as evidence offered to the court for the purpose of the court inferring therefrom the existence of a fact in issue3. These definitions summarize the academic theories or problems of the meaning of circumstantial evidence. The first definition represents the ‘chain’ theory of circumstantial evidence. Proponents of this theory view it as a round chain, each piece of which is represented by a piece of evidentiary fact adduced before the court4. The second and third definitions emphasize the so-called ‘inference’ or ‘rope’ theory. This postulates that circumstantial evidence is like a rope with several cords one of which may not be able to lift the weight of proof but which if joined together with others can then lift and carry the burden of proof and establish the fact(s) in issue. Thus, according to Pollock C.B. in R. v. Exall5 “circumstantial evidence is more like the case of a rope composed of several cords. One strand of the cord might be sufficient to sustain the weight but three stranded together may be quite of sufficient strength”6 This paper does not dwell upon these disputations. Rather, it examines the judicial law adjudication in Nigeria with special reference to the Supreme Court as constituted since the past decade. It would be shown that by and large the Supreme Court has consistently adopted a broad-minded approach in applying circumstantial evidence in criminal causes, which have come before it. This it has done without prejudice to the general proposition that each case must be examined strictly on its own merit. In examining the contemporary effort of the Supreme Court of Nigeria it is apposite to begin with an account, however brief, of the days past. This would help to shed light on the lofty works, which is on-going in our apex court.

Of all the varied attempts to capture the meaning of the term ‘constitution’, it seems that the effort of Prof. O. Hood Phillips is the more far-reaching. According to the learned writer,1 a constitution can be construed in the abstract and in the concrete. For him, a constitution in the abstract is the system of laws, customs and conventions that define the composition and powers of organs of the state and regulate the relations of the various state organs to one another and to the private citizen. A constitution in the concrete sense, on the other hand, is the document in which the most important laws of the country are authoritatively ordained. The position in Britain aptly illustrates Phillips’ notion of an abstract constitution. You will seek in vain if you search for a particular document embodying or which is entitled the ‘British Constitution’. Yet, it is undoubted that the British people have over the past centuries held steadfastly to some documents, statutes, legislations, etc, as fundamental to the British Union.2 It is in this context that one can suppose that a constitution is not merely the whole collection of rules, legal and non-legal, but a selection of them, which have usually been embodied in one document or a few closely related documents. Constitutions have been classified into different types even before the term gained ascendancy in the modern sense.3 In this paper; our concern is with the qualitative classification of a constitution as autochthonous; by which we mean a homegrown constitution.4 We shall examine this constitutional model in the context of Nigeria’s experience in constitutional evolution. We shall trace this evolution with special emphasis on the period 1960 till date. Our aim is to draw attention to the imperative of an autochthonous constitution in Nigeria.